I agreed with the majority that Ukraine’s air defense forces would collapse early in the war. However, the Russian Air Force was unable to do so. I am well aware of how hard that is. However, the Russian military seems to have given up too quickly.

In the last week of February 2022, when the Russian Air Force’s attack began, experts knew that hundreds of Russian tactical aircraft were gathering near northern/eastern/southern Ukraine, but noted that most of them were just staying at their own airfields in the early stages of the war. Some carried out aerial vigilance for advancing Russian ground forces, but allowed Ukrainian tactical aircraft to still fly.Justin Bronk, an aviation power expert at the Royal United Services Institute, said, “The Russian military feels burdened by the lack of precision ammunition/large-scale joint air operations capabilities/experienced pilots.”Whatever the reason, senior U.S. military leaders could not give a convincing interpretation of the Russian Air Force’s decision to give up its air power projection. This is because the majority of Ukrainian air defense capabilities are old-fashioned based on the former Soviet Union, and Russian troops already fill their forces with weapons that exceed their capabilities.

a Russian fighter bomber shot down.

Honestly, I was a bit surprised. It is understandable to understand how difficult it is for the Russian military not to take control of the air and the air defense system, but I thought that the Russian military has special insight and insight to identify weaknesses in these systems.

The remarks made by General Hecker, the European chief of the U.S. Air Force, coincided with those made by General Charles Brown (Air Force Chief of Staff) in June 2022.

Su-35 shot down in southern Harkiu (April, 2022)The system they are targeting (Russian Air Force) is their own. They should have understood the whole system and especially how to neutralize it.This question asks me the same question myself. Do you mean that the Russian army has a poor understanding of their system and doesn’t know how to destroy it?Before the Russian invasion, Ukrainian forces began to modernize their forces on a massive scale for several years. The overall Ukrainian military training and equipment rescue system has changed, which played a significant role in responding to the Russian invasion. However, Ukrainian troops are still fighting against Russian troops with weapons systems based on Soviet heritage, and air and air defense capabilities are particularly dependent.Ukrainian air defense forces rely on systems such as the S-300 series (P/V), Buk, Tor and Igla.Ukrainian 9K35 Strela-10 Field Air Defense System.Ukraine’s military equipment is rapidly becoming Westernized due to its high-intensity war of attrition.The Ukrainian military has advanced mid- to long-range air defense systems such as Patriot, NASAMS and IRIS-T, and short-range air defense systems such as Stinger/Geppard, which requested such support before the war.The main concern of Ukraine-backed Western countries is whether they can supply enough ammunition to the Ukrainian Air Force/Air Defense Forces to respond to sustained attacks by the Russian Air Force.The lack of ammunition by Ukraine’s air defense forces means that Russian troops will be allowed to regain control of the air.General James Hecker, head of the European U.S. Air Force, said the Ukrainian military contact group is focusing on supplying enough ammunition for the Kiwi’s air defense system.To add what I thought while reading an analysis article on the failure of the Russian Aerospace Force by Business Insider, ● Lack of modern operational capabilities.The Russian Air Force has the world’s second-largest air force in terms of size, but the problem is that it is not as systematic as the U.S. Air Force. The Russian Air Force, which has roots in the former Soviet Air Force, may have built up a lot of know-how in intercepting and long-range patrol operations, but they have not been able to escape from the early 1960s when the U.S. attacked Soviet air defense missiles.The reason why the Russian military is struggling is that it cannot develop the capability to carry out systematic SEAD missions like the U.S., and specialized weapons (equipment for SEAD missions such as AGM-88 HARM and EA-18G Growler in the west) are also suitable.The Russian military had only 10 years of experience dealing with Mujahedin’s Stinger MANPADS in Afghanistan during the Soviet era, but failed to develop systematic capabilities by imitating the U.S. military’s SEAD mission capabilities in 1991 Desert Storm and 1999 Allied Force. The U.S. conducts numerous “~flack” drills, led by Red Flack, on the U.S. mainland alone or jointly with allies every year. Even the most recognized Red Flag is held at least three to four times a year, changing participating allies every year, and the joint training conducted by European and Asian forces with local ally partners is different.In Red Flack alone, practical mock training is underway according to all scenario scenarios performed by the Air Force.The Russian army doesn’t even have enough training… The problem is that they only train small-scale formation groups.If the Russian army had such capabilities, it would not have failed as it does now.● the sloppy planning of the Russian military.Since the Desert Storm (Gulf War) began in 1991, the U.S.-led multinational forces have systematically hit the opponent’s war infrastructure, from frontline troops in Kuwait desert to core facilities in Iraq’s capital, and their capabilities have plummeted.The air operation took nearly 1.5 months, and the media and military experts criticized Schwarzkov’s multinational force headquarters every day over the longer-than-expected air operation.As a result, the ground war ended in about 100 hours and Iraqi troops returned to Iraq with wounds.Considering that it has introduced the situation of the Ukrainian war since 2021, six months before the war, the Russian military did not make this much effort.During Desert Storm’s air operation planning process, the U.S. dismissed Colonel Warden, head of the initial operational planning team that planned the air operation for more than a week, and added experts again on the mainland to completely transform it into a large-scale air operation well over a month.Instant Thunder? No! Dessert storm!! [Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptura, the actual designer of the Gulf War aviation strategy]When you think of the 1991 Gulf War, you may hear a joke that it is a war that the Air Force has devoted itself to. The role and weight of the Air Force is considerable…m.blog.naver.comJohn Warden’s “Instant Thunder,” which was famous as the best operational planner in the U.S. Air Force at the time, only attacked 84 targets for six days, while his new “Desert Storm” operation turned into 476 targets in six weeks. David Deptura, who led the operation with the support of newly appointed Brigadier General Buster Grothon, was transferred to the U.S. Air Force as a lieutenant general in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003.The U.S. military carried out 29,300 sotti during the Gulf War and lost 14 aircraft. （* The total combat loss of the multinational force was fixed profit 39/rotational profit 5) The Iraqi army they faced was a strong force that is estimated to have 16,000 missile defense equipment, 7,000 anti-aircraft guns and 750 tactical aircraft. To control this, the Air Force of the multinational force dispatched more than 1,000 U.S. aircraft to the Middle East alone.（* The U.S.-led multinational air force divided its operational area into sections called “KillBox” and assigned a formation to carry out the operation to systematically wipe out enemy ground forces.In addition to such forward air blocking operations, the U.S. bombed Iraqi air bases scattered throughout Baghdad to destroy the enemy’s war infrastructure behind it. The Air Force of the Multinational Forces lost a total of 75 planes to combat and non-combat losses (fixed wing 52/rotor wing 23), including 14 planes lost by the U.S., but was able to lead the war to victory quickly enough to offset such damage. (*Battle loss is fixed profit 39 / Rotation profit 5) ● Gulf War Multinational Force aircraft damage ●Attachment www-rjlee-org-air-ds-aloss-(1), save computer in pdf file downloadSave to Neighbor MYBOXSave to Neighbor MYBOXConsidering that damage is an inevitable factor to bear in the war, it is questionable how efficiently the Russian military used them in the Ukrainian airspace compared to their enormous power.※ If the Russian army had systematically carried it into a war of attrition for a long time at the risk of considerable damage, the Russian army would have achieved its desired goal even if it suffered great damage. Considering the current damage, the damage has increased sharply due to the long-term war of attrition without achieving results.● Trial and error and lack of willingness to challenge.The Russian military, especially the aerospace force, is a bizarre organization that was commanded by General Slovikin due to his close friendship with President Putin.What General Slovikin, who was posted to the Air Force before the war, did became clear after the war in Ukraine.The Russian Air Force failed to show systematic offensive air operations.Even if the military type had a vision and willingness to lead innovation, the situation would have improved a little, but as pointed out by the “Business Insider” article above, Slovikin’s Air Force could not play its original role.The role of aerial artillery to help ground forces on the front line could not be further demonstrated.Innovation involves trial and error and cost.WW (Wild Wiesel). A symbol of the SEAD mission. It is no exaggeration to say that the U.S. Air Force developed an air defense network, or SEAD mission, in the mid-1960s when the U.S. Air Force challenged North Vietnam’s air defense forces, which introduced SA-2 air defense systems from the former Soviet Union.F-100F, SEAD pioneer [Vietnam War WW (Wild Wizzle) Operation] When the Soviet Union demonstrated its effectiveness by introducing a practical surface-to-air missile SA-2, the U.S. quickly came up with countermeasures…m.blog.naver.comF-100F, SEAD pioneer [Vietnam War WW (Wild Wizzle) Operation] When the Soviet Union demonstrated its effectiveness by introducing a practical surface-to-air missile SA-2, the U.S. quickly came up with countermeasures…m.blog.naver.comHistorical SEAD First SAMKILL (December 22, 1965) The first success in the history of SEAD operations in the United States is December 22, 1965.” Alan Lamb (Pilot) / Jack Donovan … m.blog.naver.comHistorical SEAD First SAMKILL (December 22, 1965) The first success in the history of SEAD operations in the United States is December 22, 1965.” Alan Lamb (Pilot) / Jack Donovan … m.blog.naver.comDaring duo “O’Connell/Warless” took control of SAM sites (1966.11.2) In the early Vietnam War, the U.S. military operated F-100 super savers in operations in North Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The level of enemy air force aircraft… m.blog.naver.comIn the early days, the U.S. Air Force carried out Rolling Thunder, an air operation against North Vietnam, without enough radar alarm reception, and the U.S. Air Force struggled with a new threat: SA-2, a Soviet air defense system.In response, the U.S. Air Force quickly reorganized its organization and fostered an organization to deal with SA-2.Introduction to RHAW (Radar Radio Detection and Alert) Equipment [August 3, 1965] Measures to deal with SA-2 missiles under the leadership of U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Kenneth Demster … m.blog.naver.comIntroduction to RHAW (Radar Radio Detection and Alert) Equipment [August 3, 1965] Measures to deal with SA-2 missiles under the leadership of U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Kenneth Demster … m.blog.naver.comAPR-25 Scope and Control PanelThe U.S. military’s early Wild Wizzle attack aircraft, equipped with a scope (L)/control panel (warning lamp & voice alarm) radar alarm receiver and a device to locate SA-2 fire control radar, captured the North Vietnamese SA-2 position with only unguided rockets and cluster bullets.Mobilized to SEAD in the early days before AGM-45 Shrike and others appeared.Wild Wiesel vs. SA-2 (Rolling Thunder and Air Defense System Response) In 1965, a U.S. military plane was attacked by SA-2 throughout Vietnam, and full-scale control of air defense positions…m.blog.naver.comIt was dangerous by current standards, but ambitious pilots of the U.S. Air Force participated in the SEAD mission and gained experience to learn how to attack,Dedicated equipment for radar attacks. AGM-45 / 78AGM-45 ShrikeThe U.S. Air Force Research Department and defense companies have developed and put into action the previous generation of modern AGM-88 HARM missiles, including the AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard.Made up of hunter/killer teams, it was incapacitated by AGM-45/78 and scorched by cluster munitions.SA-2 position attack. an explosion occurred.SA-2 position. Cluster bomb attack.At this time, a Medal of Honor winner was produced among U.S. pilots who participated in the SEAD mission, and the U.S. military has since refined its SEAD mission technology.Operation F105F Wild Wiesel and Rolling Thunder [SEAD Mission]The F105F, classified as “Wild Wiesel 3,” is a double-seated type with pilots and electronic warfare officers on board. They’re Rolls… m.blog.naver.comOperation F105F Wild Wiesel and Rolling Thunder [SEAD Mission]The F105F, classified as “Wild Wiesel 3,” is a double-seated type with pilots and electronic warfare officers on board. They’re Rolls… m.blog.naver.comU.S. Pilot vs. SA-2 Operator When SA-2 was first introduced, American pilots did not know how to deal with this huge telegraph pole… m.blog.naver.comU.S. Pilot vs. SA-2 Operator When SA-2 was first introduced, American pilots did not know how to deal with this huge telegraph pole… m.blog.naver.comnosegunners & bears, Wild Withle’s teamwork (SEAD mission for Operation Rolling Thunder) No wonder teamwork is important among crew members on double-seated planes, but the number of SEAD missions to control air defense networks… m.blog.naver.comnosegunners & bears, Wild Withle’s teamwork (SEAD mission for Operation Rolling Thunder) No wonder teamwork is important among crew members on double-seated planes, but the number of SEAD missions to control air defense networks… m.blog.naver.comOpen the driveway (Wildwisel’s SEAD mission: air raid on the “Taiguen” steel plant) Wildwisel crew pioneered a new genre of surface-to-air missile and air defense network suppression (SEAD) … m.blog.naver.comOpen the driveway (Wildwisel’s SEAD mission: air raid on the “Taiguen” steel plant) Wildwisel crew pioneered a new genre of surface-to-air missile and air defense network suppression (SEAD) … m.blog.naver.com”Wild Wiesel” pilot Leo Souness … (April 19, 1967: Medal of Honor) Major “Leo Souness” (pilot) and “Harold Johnson (electronic warfare officer)” on board April 19, 1967 … m.blog.naver.com”Wild Wiesel” pilot Leo Souness … (April 19, 1967: Medal of Honor) Major “Leo Souness” (pilot) and “Harold Johnson (electronic warfare officer)” on board April 19, 1967 … m.blog.naver.comFirst In, Last Out….Wild Wizzle’s Fate (1967.8.11 ‘Paul Dormer’ Bridge Raid) First In, Last Out.. It’s the slowest time to be deployed and withdrawn before anyone else… To explain a dangerous mission… m.blog.naver.comThe ADM-160 MALD, an elaborate deception provided by the U.S. to Ukraine and frequently used, is the successor to the ADM-141 TALD/ITALD deception that the U.S. used on a large scale during the 1991 Gulf War and shows its technology to accurately describe U.S. tactical aircraft radio waves.ADM-141 “TALD” IN THE “FORMER YOUGOSLAVIA” Since the confrontation between aircraft and air defense networks began in earnest, both sides have kept each other in check as spears and shields…m.blog.naver.comADM-141 “TALD” IN THE “FORMER YOUGOSLAVIA” Since the confrontation between aircraft and air defense networks began in earnest, both sides have kept each other in check as spears and shields…m.blog.naver.comADM-141 TALD.향상된 I-TTALD(GULF WAS 1991)미국은 1991년 TALD를 이용해 이라크 방공군을 기만했고, 이라크군은 전쟁 초기에 이들을 공격해 미군 항공기 100여 대를 격추했다고 발표했습니다.미군 SEAD 미끼 “MALD” 등장 [루한스크 반군 지역(UKR)] 우크라이나 정부가 아직 공격 일정을 정하지 못했지만 최전선에서… m.blog.naver.com미군 SEAD 미끼 “MALD” 등장 [루한스크 반군 지역(UKR)] 우크라이나 정부가 아직 공격 일정을 정하지 못했지만 최전선에서… m.blog.naver.com현재 우크라이나군이 제공해 사용하는 MALD는 스톰섀도 미사일과 함께 사용되고 있어 러시아 방공망을 속여 작전 성공에 기여하고 있습니다. ● ● ADM-160 MALD현재 우크라이나군이 제공해 사용하는 MALD는 스톰섀도 미사일과 함께 사용되고 있어 러시아 방공망을 속여 작전 성공에 기여하고 있습니다. ● ● ADM-160 MALD현재 우크라이나군이 제공해 사용하는 MALD는 스톰섀도 미사일과 함께 사용되고 있어 러시아 방공망을 속여 작전 성공에 기여하고 있습니다. ● ● ADM-160 MALD현재 우크라이나군이 제공해 사용하는 MALD는 스톰섀도 미사일과 함께 사용되고 있어 러시아 방공망을 속여 작전 성공에 기여하고 있습니다. ● ● ADM-160 MALD현재 우크라이나군이 제공해 사용하는 MALD는 스톰섀도 미사일과 함께 사용되고 있어 러시아 방공망을 속여 작전 성공에 기여하고 있습니다. ● ● ADM-160 MALD